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LANGUAGE AND THE SENTIMENT OF NATIONALITY

CARL DARLING BUCK

University of Chicago

The nineteenth century, it is a commonplace to remark, witnessed a notable revival of nationalistic sentiment, the germs of which go back to the eighteenth, and the political consequences of which are in considerable part still outstanding. The emancipation of the Balkan States, the union of Italy, and the consolidation of Germany, were substantial, though incomplete, realizations of nationalism. The Germanization of Austria-Hungary, which had seemed inevitable, was brought to a halt by the national revival of Slav and Magyar. And today, not to mention the Irish situation, Eastern Europe is fairly alive with smaller nationalities seeking to gain or to maintain autonomous development. Nationalism, in spite of, or rather because of its being so largely a matter of sentiment, is the most active force in European politics. The dynastic system, certainly, is only a superficial relic of a past reality; loyalty to a dynasty, except as it is identified with nationalism, has lost its former significance. And on the other hand, a socialistic brotherhood which shall rise superior to the bounds of nationality is a dream of the future.

Some writers, it is true, believe that the force of nationalism is exaggerated, that the dominant issues now are, some say economic, others those of democracy. No doubt in some of the more recent national movements democratic and nationalistic aspirations are combined, but the latter are more intense and have by far the stronger popular hold. The economic issues too are also nationalistic. When it is affirmed that the present war is in the last analysis a conflict over trade expansion, it cannot be meant for example that what the Germans want, and feel themselves thwarted in, is merely expansion of their trade, more opportunities for individual Germans, but rather that they

desire spheres where they may develop trade as Germans, where they may maintain and extend their German nationality, instead of submerging it in that of others. Prof. Hans Delbrück emphasizes that "colonial policy must be dictated not merely by commercial but rather by national interests," and adds "The first proviso for a colony which aspires to be an assistance to Germany is the absolute supremacy of the German language."[1] No estimate of ultimate causes can eliminate the element of national jealousy, and as for the immediate occasion of the war, that is most obviously of nationalistic character, the conflict between Austria and Serbia growing out of the Pan-Serbian agitation.

Contrary to a popular impression that nationality is something fixed and capable of exact definition, it has come to be recognized that it is rather a product of historical development, and that all attempts to formulate a series of universally applicable prerequisites break down. Nationality is essentially subjective, an active sentiment of unity, within a fairly extensive group, a sentiment based upon real but diverse factors, political, geographical, physical, and social, any or all of which may be present in this or that case, but no one of which must be present in all cases.[2]

[1] *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1915, p. 528.

[2] Cf. especially Eduard Meyer, Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte, pp. 37 ff., who remarks justly that the different factors contributing to the sentiment of nationality must be investigated for each nationality separately. Yet there is no impropriety in isolating, for purposes of observation, and surveying the rôle of one particular factor,—such as language, the obvious relation of which to national sentiment has not of course been overlooked by writers on nationality, but the relative importance of which is variously estimated. This is what is attempted in the following—not exhaustively, for this would mean a review of all linguistic and political history, but by means of illustrations selected from ancient and modern times. We are not concerned with any doctrinaire thesis of the ideal relationship between language and nationality,—nor, again, with the problem whether what seems to many the economic folly of preserving minor languages from extinction is not more than offset by the sometimes extraordinary impulse to educational progress which attends a linguistic-national revival. We are concerned here only with the question of what the relationship between language and national sentiment has been as a matter of historical fact.

The most casual observer recognizes that nationality and the state are not synonomous, though they often coincide, and "nation" is now used most commonly in a political sense. It is to avoid this political connotation of "nation," or at least its ambiguity, that "nationality" has come to be preferred to "nation" in its broader sense. Political union is the natural consummation of nationality; and conversely, such union may in time create a genuine nationality out of heterogeneous elements, as in Switzerland. But, as we well know, nationality often exists without corresponding political expression. With the partition of Poland, the Poles did not cease to be a nationality. The Austro-Hungarian empire comprises not one nationality or two, but ten. The ancient Greeks in the period of their highest development were a nationality, but not a nation in the political sense, likewise the Germans in the time of Goethe.

The notion of physical kinship, inherent in the word "nation" by derivation, and fitting the romantic idea of the evolution of family to nation, is perhaps the most conspicuous element in the popular conception of nationality, and at the same time the least real factor. We speak of the "German race" or the "Latin races," to the distress of the anthropologist, who feels that the use of the word "race" in any such connection is an absurdity. For there are no pure races, in a physical sense, in Europe, and real racial distinctions of skull, stature, hair, complexion, etc., so far as they are still traceable with any definiteness, cut right across the existing nationalities. They reflect a grouping so remote in the past as to be of wholly subordinate interest for the historical period. In short, the "races of Europe" in the language of the anthropologist have nothing to do with the "race of Europe" in the popular sense, where "race" is merely a convenient equivalent of "people" or "nationality."

But supposing that we ignore the remote racial classifications, and understand kinship in a more limited sense, as common descent within a given historical period. Beyond question the belief in such kinship is generally an important element in national consciousness. Yet we have only to think of the extent of invasion and colonization to which nearly every corner

of Europe has been subject, to realize that this belief can only be approximately true. And, what is more significant, no matter how nearly true it may be, it is not demonstrable. Recorded descent is at best restricted to a few families. It is the linguistic descent which is really demonstrable, and which is instinctively felt as evidence of national descent.[3]

Sociologists speak of a certain "likemindedness" as the fundamental characteristic of nationality. No doubt, especially in the more fully developed nationalities, there is something which goes deeper than all external criteria, and a true understanding of this something is the highest goal,—but also the most difficult. Its definition is so delicate a matter that there is danger of its proving illusory even in the hands of scholars, and it is scarcely a substantial reality in the common man's consciousness of nationality. That which is tangible and observable, and also the basis of "likemindedness," is community in definite customs and institutions; and of these the most important are religion and language.

A common form of religion was a conspicuous element of national consciousness in the ancient world, where religions were distinctly national. In eastern Europe there is still a close relationship between church and nationality, and the church has

[3] And not improperly, if we understand by this the physical descent of, at the very least, a considerable portion of a nation, and especially its social descent. In the reaction against the careless confusion of language and race, there is now perhaps less danger of overestimating than of underestimating the historical bearing of linguistic evidence. For it is still a truism that language implies a people speaking it. It does not pass from one people to another without human agency. In the majority of cases of racial mixture it is the language of the numerically superior element which survives, so that here linguistic descent reflects also the physical descent of the majority. The mere physical domination of a small body of invaders, forming only the ruling class, is not sufficient to impose their language upon the masses. Witness the fate of the Franks or the Normans in France, the Swedish founders of the Russian state, the Asiatic Bulgars, the Manchus in China. In those cases where a minority has imposed its language upon the majority, as for example the Romans in Gaul, this is all the more evidence of the dominance of this minority in social organization. The linguistic descent then reflects a degree of physical descent by no means inconsiderable, but especially what it is fair to call the main line of social descent.

been a powerful agency in maintaining language and nationality.[4] But it needs no demonstration that in modern Europe distinctions of religion and nationality are not to be identified. Everywhere the lines intersect. Even among Asiatic peoples, where the religious factor has so largely overshadowed ethnic distinctions, a change is observable in the direction of a keener sense of nationality on the linguistic basis, as for example among the Crimean Tartars, or in the new Turkish nationalism.

If we turn now to language, as the factor which is to engage our especial attention, it is, of course obvious enough that this also is no universal criterion. The inhabitants of Switzerland do not regard themselves as Germans, Frenchmen and Italians (to ignore here the small "Romansch" element), but as Swiss. Centuries of a common history have created a sentiment of common nationality, in spite of the difference in speech. We are not merely a different nation politically, but are sensible of being a distinct nationality from the English, in spite of community of language. And in general the nationalities of the Western Hemisphere have developed upon a geographical and political basis. Again, the Irish nationality is obviously not restricted to the small fraction which still speaks Irish. At the same time the effort of the Gaelic League to revive interest in the Irish tongue is a notable phase of the national revival. It was an Irishman who once said with feeling: "A people without a language of its own is only half a nation. A nation should guard its language more than its territories, 'tis a surer barrier,

[4] The Turkish identification of religion and nationality and the centuries-long grouping of all the Christian subjects in one "millet" enabled the Greeks, who were in complete control of church and education, as well as of commerce, not only to maintain but even to extend their language and nationality. The well-to-do Bulgarians and Wallachians spoke Greek and called themselves Greek, and in many cases this meant a permanent accession to Greek nationality. The movement was halted by the nineteenth century revivals of the other Balkan peoples, notably the Bulgarian, which was directed first and foremost against the Greek domination of the church. Although the Greeks are still inclined to claim what they call the "Bulgarian-speaking Greeks," namely those who adhere to the Greek patriarch instead of the Bulgarian exarch, this is hopelessly untenable. And, indeed, the undisputed claims of Greek nationality on the linguistic basis offer a goal sufficiently advanced for the most ambitious politician.

a more important frontier than mountain or river." On the other hand, Professor Mahaffy, who has as little sympathy with the language movement as with Home Rule, remarks: "It seems to be a profound mistake that distinct nationality can only be sustained by distinct language."

In a strict sense this is of course true. But the "profound mistake" is rooted in the observation of what is the general rule rather than of what is the exception. It is the other situation, the intimate relation between language and nationality, which in Europe certainly dominates alike the naïve attitude of the common man and the deliberate policy of statesmen. The belief that loss of language means loss of nationality is instinctive and also supported by countless examples in history.

For of all the institutions which mark a common nationality, language is the one of which a people is most conscious and to which it is most fanatically attached. It is the one conspicuous banner of nationality, to be defended against encroachment, as it is the first object of attack on the part of a power aiming to crush out a distinction of nationality among its subject peoples. Furthermore, it is matter of record that several of the nineteenth century revivals had their beginnings in the field of language and literature, beginnings which were safe and unobtrusive, but most effective in awakening national consciousness. Even the dry-as-dust philologist, all innocent of political interest, has in more than one instance definitely contributed to this end. Up to the most recent times questions of language rights have held the first place in national propaganda, and have been the occasion of political upheaval, riot, and revolution. With few exceptions the European nationalities are essentially language groups; and especially for those in eastern Europe, which can not be defined in political or geographical terms, language is the admitted criterion of nationality, the only one available for statistical purposes.

The familiar modern policy of denationalizing a subject people by imposing the language of the dominant nationality, or, expressed less offensively, of unifying heterogeneous elements of the state by encouraging unity of speech, has ample precedent.

The Assyrian king Sargon boasts of having carried into captivity peoples speaking strange languages and varied dialects, and *made them of one speech.* An example which strikes one as equally remote in the past, though far from it in actual date, is, curiously enough, from the Western World. From a Spanish-Inca writer we learn that the Incas imposed their language upon all the subject tribes of their empire. Teachers were provided in all the towns, and it was understood that no one could attain any considerable office who was not acquainted with the state language.

The political expansion of Rome carried with it, step by step, the spread of its language. When the Greek language had reached its greatest expansion, Latin was still confined to a few square miles. Within a few centuries it had become a world language. No administrative career was open to one ignorant of Latin, nor even, in theory at least, the prize of Roman citizenship. While there is no evidence of the systematic application of a linguistic test, and indeed this was obviously impracticable when citizenship was granted wholesale to towns and provinces, we are told, for example, that the emperor Claudius deprived a Lycian of Roman citizenship because of his annoying inability to understand Latin. Wherever Roman domination was complete and long continued, the intensiveness of its organization inevitably resulted in the general adoption of Latin and the extinction of the native languages. Hence the present "Latin nations" or "Latin races," terms which on their face illustrate the popular recognition of the relation between language and nationality.

Exception must be made of the Greek East, where the maintenance of the Greek language, and thereby of Greek nationality, was never seriously imperilled by Roman rule. A language which educated Romans were accustomed to look up to as a superior vehicle of literature and education, which Cicero, for example, speaks of as read among "almost all peoples" in contrast to Latin confined to "its own rather narrow boundaries," could not be put on the same plane as the uncultivated languages of Western Europe. The use of Latin in Greece was never more

than a thin official veneer, and even officially Greek was not deprived of all standing. Public regulations were published in parallel Latin and Greek versions. Towns often addressed communications to Rome in Greek. Greeks were at times even allowed to address the Roman senate in Greek. It is all the more interesting to note the disposition of Roman officialdom to insist on the prestige of Latin. The practice of permitting Greek in the Roman senate was frowned upon and on occasion definitely prohibited. Cicero was blamed for having addressed the Syracusan assembly in Greek. High Roman officials in Greece, however well able to speak Greek, made a point of pronouncing their formal addresses in Latin, which was then rendered into Greek by an interpreter. To cite only one of several instances on record, Aemilius Paulus after the battle of Pydna spoke privately to the defeated Perseus in Greek, but at the assembly of Amphipolis he made his formal proclamation to the Macedonians in Latin, which was then repeated in Greek by the praetor.

No other European nationality has so long a recorded history as the Greek, and nowhere is the connection with the development of nationality and with its maintenance more apparent. While the Roman nationality developed at a definite center, as did the language, and was from the outset centralized and above all politically effective, the ancient Greek nationality was a slowly maturing sentiment of community, which did not affect the political union of the Greeks, and only rarely, and then partially, united them against a common foe. On one of these occasions, the beginning of the Persian war, the Athenians assure the Spartan envoys that they will not be faithless, to the Greek people, which is "of the same blood and of the same tongue," nor to their common shrines and like religious customs. The belief that they were of the same blood, however near the truth it might be, could not of course be founded on any record or genuine tradition, but was evolved, and incorporated in legend, out of the general consciousness of community. The tangible, observable factors which created this consciousness were speech and customs, and of these the community in speech was the most definite

and striking."[5] The identification of Greek language and nationality is transparent in Plato's lament that "all Sicily would soon be almost devoid of the Greek tongue, converted into some Phoenician or Oscan power, a result which all Greeks should earnestly oppose. The persistence of the language has been the vital factor in the maintenance of Greek nationality through all political vicissitudes down to the present day. Roman domination, the latter settlements of Slavs and Albanians on Greek soil, and the centuries of Turkish rule, only emphasized the resisting and absorbing power of the Greek language.

The relation of language to the revival of nationality, or again to its loss, is well illustrated by the history of the Slavic peoples, all but one of which have at some period been in danger of denationalization, and some completely absorbed. Or let us say rather the Balto-Slavic peoples, for the Lithuanians and the Letts, although loosely referred to as Slavs, are not Slavic, but only nearest akin to the Slavs. The Lithuanians and the Lettic languages, with the extinct Old Prussian, form the Baltic subdivision of what philologists call the Balto-Slavic branch of the Indo-European family.

The never ending conflict between Slav and German has been going on since the time of Charles the Great. For Slavic tribes had occupied the old Germanic land as far west as the Elbe and beyond, so that a line drawn from the mouth of the Elbe to the head of the Adriatic would mark roughly the line between Ger-

[5] It is to be noted that the Greek language in contrast to Latin was as slow to attain that degree of uniformity which we expect in a "national language," as was Greek nationality to effect political unity. The particularistic tendency manifested in the system of rival city-states had its counterpart in the linguistic situation. Until a late period there was no Greek language in the sense of a single standard language used throughout Greece, but rather numerous local dialects, each paramount in both spoken and written form within its own domain. These dialects, however, had sufficient resemblance to be in the main mutually intelligible; and furthermore, while no one dialect prevailed exclusively even in literature, the works of the Greek poets, whether in Aeolic, Ionic, Attic or Doric guise, were familiar to all Greece. So, in spite of the long continued diversity in dialect, the Greeks could not fail to realize that they were of one tongue, that all others were "barbarians." And eventually the dialect of Athens became, first the recognized language of prose literature, and, later in a modified form, the common language of the Greek world.

man and Slav. All the vast region including Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, etc., was for centuries Slavic, as hundreds of the local names still show. This was reoccupied by German colonists, and the unorganized and uncivilized Slavic tribes, as they were converted to Christianity, were also Germanized. A detached branch northeast of Hanover retained their speech till the beginning of the eighteenth century. Now there remain only the Lusatian Wends or Sorbians, a little Slavic oasis, northeast of Dresden. While loyal Germans in political sentiment, they still retain their Slavic speech (beside German, for they are bilingual), but in diminishing numbers, and it is only a question of time when it will be as dead as Cornish, and with it every trace of distinct nationality have disappeared as completely as was long since the case with the Slavs further west and north.

Like the northern Slavs, so also the Baltic Prussians of the Königsberg region, whose language, preserved in sixteenth century catechisms, is of extraordinary interest to the philologist, were completely Germanized by the seventeenth century. Yet their name lived on to vastly greater fame. For Prussia in its original sense, the present province of East Prussia, whence the first "King of Prussia," crowned at Königsberg, derived his title, has its name, of course, from these Baltic Prussians, next akin to the Lithuanians and Letts. It is this transfer of the name, coupled with the fact that so much of present Prussia was once Slavic territory, that is the excuse for one of the many misleading statements elicited by the present war, namely that the Prussians are really Slavs.

The barrier to the further eastward progress of Germanization was the consolidation of the Poles. Here too Germanization was threatened, especially in the thirteenth century, when immense numbers of German colonists poured in. But by this time the Polish state, which had its beginning in the tenth century, was fairly strong, and a native Polish clergy worked actively for maintenance of the Polish language. The church authorities definitely ordered that the people should be taught the *pater noster* in Polish, and that in the schools there should be only teachers who were acquainted with Polish. Later, after Poland

became a great power, all danger of Germanization was past. The consciousness of nationality and pride in the national language and literature became so strong that no subsequent political events could efface it.

Since the decease of Poland as a political entity, the language has been the one ineradicable mark of nationality; and this has been recognized alike by the Poles themselves and by the governments that have sought to assimilate them. The attempt of Germany to Germanize its Poles by the help of repressive measures against their language has been a conspicuous failure. Instead of the Poles becoming German speaking, the German colonists in large numbers have become Polish-speaking. The Russian policy toward the Polish language, varying in severity but always repressive, has only made the Poles more obstinately attached to it.

Austria long since gave up trying to denationalize its Poles, and won their support by giving them free hand to resume their ancient dominance over the Ruthenian population of Eastern Galicia. For since 1869 Polish has been the recognized official language of all Galicia. The University of Lemberg remains wholly Polish, while the Ruthenians are clamoring for a Ruthenian University in which their own language, a form of Little Russian, shall be recognized. And in spite of violent Polish opposition this has been seriously considered by Austria, as a means of strengthening the sentiment of a Ruthenian nationality as distinct from Russian, and offsetting Russian propaganda in Galicia. For the official Russian policy toward the "Ukrainian" movement is not to recognize the Ruthenians, or their own Little Russians, as a distinct nationality with a distinct language, but to stamp them plain Russians.[6]

Now that Polish autonomy is being freely promised by both sides in the present conflict, it is well to realize that this is something very different from a restoration of the old Poland at the height of its power. For this was only partly of Polish nationality, the larger portion being Russian or Lithuanian.

[6] See p. 56.

The world has almost forgotten the existence of a Lithuanian people, and that they ever played a rôle in history. They are now scarcely two millions in number, a small fraction in the extreme northeast of Prussia (the region including Memel, Tilsit and Gumbinnen), where they have been under German Protestant influence since the time of the German Order, the rest in that part of Russia which lies to the east of this and south of Courland, which is Lettic. This, only extended further south, has been their home since they are first heard of in the eleventh century in conflict with the Russians. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a succession of able Lithuanian princes conquered an immense stretch of Russian territory, south far beyond Kiev and east almost to Moskow, and at the same time withstood the might of the German Order. Thus was established what is known in history as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or simply Lithuania, which once reached from the Baltic to the Black Sea. By the marriage in 1386 of the queen of Poland with the Lithuanian Grand Duke Yagello, who was crowned king of Poland, a dynastic union was effected. For some two centuries Lithuania continued to be governed directly by native princes, who strove to resist its subordination to Polish interests. But with the more effective union of Lublin in 1569 Lithuania virtually disappeared from history. Despite some later abortive separatist efforts, in which the famous Radziwill family was prominent, it remained an integral part of Poland, until by the partition it came into the hands of Russia.

Of this Lithuania of history only a relatively small portion, in the north, was really Lithuanian in speech. The rest was White Russian and Little Russian. The official language employed by the Lithuanian rulers was a form of Russian, and in later times Polish became the language of administration and of education. Lithuanian was never the state language, was not taught in the schools, and received no literary cultivation. It was merely the language of the peasant class in the north, and likewise in Prussian Lithuania, and the little that was written there in Lithuanian before the eighteenth century was exclusively of religious character, Bible translations and tracts for the instruction of the peasantry.

Nevertheless the language, however obscure its status, did survive, and it is this alone which prevented the total obliteration of Lithuanian nationality. Without it the Lithuanians would have long since forgotten that they were anything but Poles, Russians, or Germans. It was in Prussian Lithuania that the language first attracted the notice of the outside world. Lithuanian folk-poems were collected and translated into German, arousing the lively interest of Schiller and Goethe. But, curious as it may seem, it was the new science of comparative philology, from the early nineteenth century on, which brought most fame to the Lithuanian language. It was seen that this language was remarkable for its preservation of early forms, and it came to be regarded as a sort of Sanskrit of the West. Eminent philologists engaged in the collection and publication of the folk-literature, in making grammars and dictionaries, in editing the "Old Lithuanian" religious texts, in the minute study of local dialects, and in the scientific exposition of the history of the language. It might seem that the purely scientific interest of a small band of scholars could have no influence on the fate of a language or people. But in this case, and it is not the only one, it certainly did, by reason of the reaction on native sentiment. If the Lithuanians are reminded, as they often are by the Poles, that their language can boast no great literature, they retort that it is one of the most highly prized by scholars and is studied in the greatest universities of Europe. Even the uneducated are aware of this interest in their language, although they may be puzzled to know what it is all about.

In Prussia the fosterings of Lithuanian sentiment has never awakened governmental apprehension of political consequences and it has been left undisturbed. In Russia where is the main body of Lithuanians and where in recent times the national revival has been most pronounced, this was viewed with suspicion. Until 1904 the printing of Lithuanian books, except in Russian characters, was forbidden. Meantime large numbers of the Russian Lithuanians had emigrated to America, and found here a free outlet for their national expression and for publication. Besides their many newspapers, Lithuanian books of all

descriptions have been published here, in fact more Lithuanian was being printed here than in Europe, until the withdrawal of the Russian restriction in 1904.

Whether this action of Russia was due to a more liberal policy or with the intent of playing off the Lithuanian against the Polish movement need not concern us. There is no doubt that the two are antagonistic. The Poles wish to convince the Lithuanians that, owing to their long connection with Polish history and their debt to Polish civilization, they are virtually Poles and should be a part of the Polish movement, that their insistence on distinct nationality is only a futile "Lithuomania." The majority of Lithuanians, on the other hand, feel that they have given much to Poland in the past and received little but contemptuous patronage, and they will not be exploited further. Incorporation in an autonomous Poland is the last thing they desire. What they hope for is autonomy for themselves, or possibly with the Letts, who are nearest akin and occupy the contiguous territory to the north.

The Letts, owing their civilization to the German colonists, who began to settle at the mouth of the Duna as early as the twelfth century, were pretty thoroughly Germanized in the towns, the Lettic language being merely a peasant vernacular. But in the nineteenth century it came to be cultivated in literature and as a medium of education, and with this movement the sense of nationality grew strong. The revival of the language, being at the expense of German, was warmly favored by Russia. After it had done its work and reduced the use of German to a minimum, Russia's attitude cooled. Precisely the same considerations, it may be remarked in passing, account for Russia's alternate encouragement and discouragement of the Esthonian movement in the Dorpat region, and also of the Finnish movement, only that here it was the Swedish influence and the extensive use of Swedish by the Finns that Russia was glad to see checked by the revival of Finnish language and national sentiment.

Bohemia has been the historic center of the Slav-German struggle. It was all but Germanized, yet became the nursery of

Pan-Slavism. Bohemia and Moravia were in the eleventh century permanently united in the kingdom of Bohemia, at first in only loose dependence on the German empire, but subject to rapidly increasing Germanization. When Bohemia was at the height of its prestige under the emperor Charles IV, with Prague the imperial capital, it was virtually a German state. The Hussite movement in the fifteenth century was not merely a religious protest, but a national upheaval against Germanization, and was accompanied by intensive cultivation of the native language. This was the "golden age of Bohemian literature." But after the Catholic reaction and complete collapse of Bohemian nationality in the battle of the White Mountains in 1620, the language was regarded as an instrument of Hussitism, and all books in Bohemian, regardless of contents, were burned. Jesuit priests with escorts of soldiers searched even the homes of peasants, and one is said to have boasted that he had burned 60,000 Bohemian books. The language sank to the position of a peasant vernacular.

Towards the close of the eighteenth century began a revival of interest in the Bohemian language, which gained strength in the first half of the nineteenth century and inaugurated a general national revival. And it is well recognized that the seed was planted by a philologist, Dobrovsky (1752–1829), who devoted himself to the study of the Bohemian language and literature and to more general Slavic topics, and is known as the "father of Slavic philology." His interest was purely that of a scholar. So far from being a propagandist, he had neither faith in nor sympathy with the hope of restoring the language to literary use, and himself wrote in German. Nevertheless his scientific devotion to the language, the prestige which he won, and the interest in Slavic studies which he awakened, was a most important factor in the practical revival of the language at the hands of others who were enthusiastic propagandists, men like Kollar, whose collection of sonnets entitled "The Daughter of Slava," in glorification of an idealized Slavism, aroused unbounded enthusiasm, and above all Palacký, who was equally eminent as historian and politician. When invited to go as a delegate to the Ger-

man National Assembly at Frankfurt in 1848, Palacký made his celebrated reply, "I am not a German, but a Bohemian of Slav race."

What had been a purely literary revival was by this time a vigorous and widespread national movement. Henceforth the Bohemians were to be a thorn in the flesh of the Austrian government, and Austrian ministers have risen and fallen on the issue of language laws designed to satisfy the demands of the Bohemians. And if the latter are still far from satisfied with their constitutional status, the restoration of their nationality and language is an accomplished fact. The native language is dominant in education and literature, in the press and the theatre. It is the German element which is now on the defensive. The University of Prague has been since 1882 divided into a German and a Bohemian University, the latter with several times as many students as the former. Where not so many decades ago little Bohemian was heard in the streets of Prague (in the early part of the nineteenth century one of the literary group reported in great excitement to his friends that he had heard two well-dressed men speaking Bohemian), it is now almost dangerous to speak German. The old street-name signs have been replaced by Bohemian, just as in Laibach they have been replaced by Slovenian, these signs always being a conspicuous barometer of the linguistic situation.

The Slovaks of northern Hungary are closely akin to the Bohemians. They are simply the eastern extension of the population of Bohemia and Moravia, from which they have been cut off since their incorporation in Hungary in the eleventh century. Were it not for their long political separation, they would undoubtedly, like the Moravians, form a part of Bohemian nationality in the wider sense, using the same written language. As it is, the Bohemians think that is their true position, and speak of Slovak as a Bohemian dialect. Some of the most prominent propagandists of Bohemian language and nationality, like the poet Kollar, were of Slovak birth. They thought it the only natural and sane procedure for the Slovaks to use as their literary and standard language the existing Bohemian, from which

the Slovak dialects differed only in greater degree than the various spoken dialects of Bohemia and Moravia, and as the spoken dialects in every country differ more or less from the standard language. Had Bohemian nationality and language then enjoyed their present established position, instead of being in the first stage of revival, this view might have prevailed. And if by any future turn of events the Slovak country should be detached from Hungary and united with Bohemia, it is still possible that the Slovaks might gradually adopt Bohemian and be eventually merged in a wider Bohemian nationality,—that is, another proviso, if the Bohemians should have the rare wisdom not to force the issue. But as a matter of fact the movement, which originated with the Catholic clergy, to establish a distinct literary language on the basis of the Slovak dialects, carried the day. The Slovaks regard themselves as distinct from the Bohemians in nationality and language, and it is their own subjective view which must be, and is, accepted by the world as representing the actual present situation.[7]

[7] This is one illustration of a fact which, while not in conflict with the general thesis of the important relation between language and nationality, we do not wish to be accused of slighting,—namely that the linguistic situation itself is not something absolutely fixed, wholly immune from manipulation or independent of external factors. For example, it is owing to the political history of the Netherlands that Dutch is a distinct language, while the similar Low German of Northern Germany is only a dialect of German,—that is, according to the conventional use of "language" and "dialect." For these terms are incapable of rigid definition by purely linguistic criteria. The German "dialects" of Westphalia and Bavaria differ from each other much more than do the Danish and Swedish "languages," or Servian and Bulgarian. The popular recognition of a language as such applies primarily to a standard or literary language and the evolution of such is the result of a centralizing process, the manner and extent of which is determined by historical factors. Thus the High German of Luther's bible translation, itself based upon what had already become established as the official language of the Saxon and imperial courts, was finally adopted by the Low German speaking population of North Germany, but never in the Netherlands, though, from the purely linguistic point of view, its use there would not have been materially more difficult or artificial. Another literary language, based upon the native Low German speech had grown up here, and, owing to the political independence, had gained the status of a national language, with all its powers of resistance. The dominance of the speech of Paris marched with the political consolidation of France, and just as the South was not permanently united with the North till after the final extinction of the English claims, so it long remained outside of

The struggle of the Slovaks has been to escape Magyarization. In the nearly nine hundred years that they have been an integral part of Hungary only their language has kept them distinct, and to this they became more consciously attached with the general revival of national sentiment in the nineteenth century and the Magyarizing policy of Hungary.

The Hungarians or Magyars, it will be recalled, are not

the linguistic centralization. An ordinance of 1539 requiring the use of French in all the courts brought a formal protest from the Province against being forced to use a language which must be learned like Latin. Had the South of France remained permanently detached from the North, Provençal would have the same status as a language with French. Had the absorption by Castile of the other kingdoms constituting Spain extended to that of Portugal, its standard language would be the same Spanish, based on the dialect of Castile. There would be Portuguese dialects coördinate with Spanish dialects, but no Portuguese language in the conventional sense. But since, owing to the course of history, Portuguese did gain the status of a national language and has maintained it for centuries, its position is of course established beyond the liability to reversal, and the relation to national sentiment the same as elsewhere. Such questions as to "language" or "dialect," one nationality or two, have long since been settled in most of Europe, despite sporadic movements like the Provençal or Catalan revivals. But we must recall the historical basis of their settlement, when we face such questions as whether Slovak is a distinct language or only a dialect of Bohemian, whether Ruthenian, or more broadly, Little Russian is a distinct language or only a dialect of Russian, whether the Slavic speech in Macedonia is Bulgarian, or Serbian, or just "Macedonian Slav." For it is folly to imagine that it is only necessary to apply to the philological expert for a categorical answer. The philologist knows that Little Russian is more closely allied to Great Russian (the standard Russian language) than to any other of the Slavic tongues, and at the same time, differs from it much more than the various Great Russian dialects among themselves. But he cannot determine whether, in the course of historical events, its final relation to Russian will be parallel to that of Low German of North Germany to German, or to that of Dutch to German. The philologist knows that the Slavic speech of Macedonia has many points in common with Bulgarian, others in common with Serbian, and he may chart these in intricate "isoglossal" lines. But Serbian and Bulgarian philologists will continue to differ in the interpretation of the same facts; and if the unprejudiced conclusion is that the relation to Bulgarian is the closer, such a scientific dictum is of far less consequence than the prevailing Macedonian sentiment mainly the result of Bulgarian propaganda through their school system in favor of Bulgarian language and nationality. An extended period of either Serbian or Bulgarian control of the schools would secure the dominance of either Serbian or Bulgarian, but the latter with less resistance.

For illustration of an exceptionally conscious design in the creation of a standard language, note what is said about Croatian, p. 63.

Slavic or even Indo-European, but a people of Asiatic origin, whose language belongs to a well defined family of which Finnish is the other most important representative. This is one of the cases where language has been more persistent than race, for in physical type the Hungarians are no longer distinctively Asiatic. Hungary in the fifteenth century was one of the strongest European states, the chief bulwark against the Turkish invasions. But the defeat by the Turks in the fatal battle of Mohacs in 1526, and the later dependence upon Austria, brought Hungarian nationality to such a low ebb that at the end of the eighteenth century it seemed marked for extinction. It was a linguistic crisis which provoked a reaction and inaugurated a national revival, marked by a rapid change in language sentiment from indifference to positive fanaticism.

The order of the emperor Joseph II (1780–90) that German should be the official language throughout the empire raised a storm in every quarter, but especially in Hungary, where it expressly forbade the use of Hungarian or Latin in official matters. Now, as a matter of fact, the Hungarian nobles at this time had no great regard for the Hungarian language, which they looked upon as a peasant vernacular. They were accustomed to speak German, also French, and especially Latin, which had always been the official language of the law-courts and of legislative debate. But the definite order to substitute German for Latin as the official language was something they would not and did not accept, and thus aroused on the language question they took the first measures to resuscitate their own language, the appointment of teachers of Hungarian in the gymnasia. After the interruption of the Napoleonic wars, the movement proceeded vigorously. In 1830 the Hungarian National Academy was founded. Hungarian literature flourished, and down to the time of the revolution of 1848 and again since the Compromise of 1867, a long series of increasingly stringent language laws has enforced the use of the Magyar tongue. Eventually the only relic of official German in Hungary was in the army,—its "Words of Command." And even this so enraged the Hungarians that it was the dominant issue in the crisis of 1903–06, which nearly led to a complete breach with Austria.

But not satisfied with narrowly escaping Germanization, the Hungarians in their triumphant nationalism proceeded to attempt the Magyarization of their "subject races." The educational system and every power of the government was devoted to the propagation of the Magyar tongue. The desire of the Slovaks and other Slavic peoples, and of the Roumanians in Transylvania, for educational facilities in their own languages was systematically thwarted, and agitation for equal language rights branded as treasonable. Place names were Magyarized by law, the old Saxon Klausenburg appearing as Kolozsvar, etc. The change of personal names to a Magyar form, if partly voluntary, has also been *suggested* to government employees in official circulars. Yet the net result of the Hungarian policy has been to intensify the sense of distinct nationality, and to undermine the loyalty to the state.

The Croatians are on a different footing from the Slavs of Hungary proper. The "Illyrian movement" in the first half of the nineteenth century, of which the chief apostle was the writer Gaj, established a Croatian literary language and aroused a national sentiment able to resist the Magyarization which was then threatened and which drove Croatia into the arms of Austria in the Hungarian Revolution. And under the Compromise of 1868, although the union with Hungary, which had existed since the twelfth century, was restored, the Croatians retained substantial autonomy and full recognition of their language. It is the official language of the diet at Agram, and the delegates to Budapesth, who function only when "joint affairs" are under discussion, may also speak in Croatian, a right which they have on occasion employed as an unexcelled instrument of obstruction. The slightest infringement of the Croatian language rights provokes an outcry loud enough to reach even our American press, as in the case of the Railway Bill of 1907, which legalized Hungarian as the language of the whole state railway system including that of Croatia.

In Dalmatia too, which has belonged successively to Croatia (and so to Hungary), Venice and Austria, Croatian is now supreme in the educational system, here at the expense of the

diminishing Italian element. The Croatian language is then in an established position, with a flourishing literature and science, the center of which is Agram, and the sense of nationality is correspondingly strong. This leads to the larger question of Serbo-Croatian nationality, a political aspect of which furnished the immediate occasion of the present war.

The Croatians and Serbs are peoples of the closest linguistic kinship, but of the most fundamentally divergent historical development. The fact that the Croatians are adherents of the Roman, the Serbs of the Greek church, is indicative of their past history. The Croatians faced the Occident, the Serbs the Orient. Serbia, after becoming the most powerful Balkan state of the fourteenth century, was prostrated by over four centuries of Turkish rule, its nationality submerged and all but lost. But the language survived and furnished the basis of a national revival. Toward the end of the eighteenth century a widely travelled and broadly educated Serbian, Obrodović, ordered published a series of works in a language intelligible to the people (earlier Serbian writings had been an artificial mixture of Serbian and Russian Church Slavonic), which did more than anything else to awaken Serbian aspirations toward intellectual progress. In the early nineteenth century Vuk Karadzić's collection of Serbian folk-songs awakened European interest in the Serbians, and his philological studies and reforms of orthography laid the foundation of the modern Serbian literary language. Meantime the popular uprisings had led to the autonomy of Serbia.

In view of the profoundly different past history of Serbs and Croatians, the conception of a Serbo-Croatian unity obviously could not be of popular origin. It had its birth in philological and literary circles; and its first and most important realization was the attainment of more complete linguistic unity. This perhaps requires some explanation. Serbo-Croatian speech consists of a series of related dialects stretching from the Bulgarian confines to the Adriatic, a territory comprising Serbia (as constituted before the Balkan Wars, but only a small part of its subsequent extension south), Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Croatia, the difference being greatest

between the extremes of Eastern Serbia and Croatia in the northwest. But the leaders of the "Illyrian movement," the founders of Croatian literature, Gaj and his fellows, deliberately rejected the local Croatian of the Agram region as of too narrow scope, and adopted an intermediate type, such as Vuk Karadzić had also chosen for Serbian and which with some modification was finally accepted as the Serbian literary language. So it was brought about that the Serbian and Croatian "languages," that is the literary and standard languages as taught in the schools, are virtually the same, only under different names and written in different alphabets, Servian in the Cyrillic,[8] Croatian in the Latin.

The achievement of a common literary language has been the means of promoting intellectual unity, and the Serbo-Croatian idea, fostered by the leaders of literature and science in Agram and Belgrade, spread to wider circles and to the field of politics. The cultural and also political union of all Serbo-Croatians became a definite program. On the other hand, the difference of religion, mutual jealousy, and the existence of rival Pan-Serbian and Pan-Croatian radical movements, are serious obstacles to a genuine popular union. The Serbians are apt to speak of the greater Serb people or a Greater Serbia, including all the Croatians. The Croatians resent such a designation of themselves and their language. They are Croatians, and their language may be the same as Serbian, yet it is not "Serbian" but "Croatian." So much is in a name, when national sentiment is involved. The Austrians escape the dilemma in Bosnia by applying the

[8] One of Vuk's orthographic reforms was the adoption of one letter from the Latin alphabet. This met with violent opposition, as a fatal and unpatriotic concession to Rome. For even such an external feature of language as the form of the letters employed may become an element of religious and national sentiment. Bismarck is said to have refused to read German books printed in Roman type. In Roumania it was not the greater simplicity of the Latin alphabet that enabled it to oust the Cyrillic (one cannot imagine such a change in Russia), but the "Latin race" sentiment. We have noted the former Russian regulation that Lithuanian books could be printed only in Russian characters. When the Turks made some concessions to the Albanians regarding the written use of their language, they still insisted that Turkish characters should be employed. And while this factor is now eliminated, the two rival systems of writing Albanian in the Latin alphabet are under popular suspicion of being agencies of Austrian or Italian propaganda respectively.

term "Bosniak" to the common languages of the Croatian, Serbian, and Moslem elements. The effect of the present war upon the whole Serbo-Croatian question is one of its most interesting problems. If a union of all the Serbo-Croatian speaking peoples is ever realized, that is a genuine union satisfactory to both Croatians and Serbians, it will be a remarkable victory of an originally intellectual movement, operating upon linguistic kinship, over exceptional obstacles.

The "South-Slav" question is primarily that of Serbo-Croatian unity, but the term is also used in a wider sense to include the Slovenians, whose language is more closely related to Serbo-Croatian than to any other Slavic tongue, and whose territory borders on Croatia. The main seat of Slovenian nationality is Carniola, with Laibach its political and intellectual center. Centuries of Germanization had reduced Slovenian territory to a small fraction of its former extent, and even there German had become the language of the larger towns, and the sense of distinct nationality was almost extinguished. But here too in the nineteenth century the language was revived and has gained full recognition in local administration and education. The Slovenian movement is aggressive, and of peculiar political interest from the fact that, while the city of Trieste is mainly Italian-speaking, its Hinterland is Slovenian. When it is a question of resisting Italy, Austro-Hungary can count on the loyalty of Slovenian, Croatian, and Dalmatian.

The Bulgarians, while not included in the prevailing political use of the term "South Slav," are also southern Slavs. That is, their language is one of the southern Slavic languages, and they are regularly and properly reckoned as one of the Slavic nationalities. It is true that the Bulgars, who gave them their name, were a tribe of Asiatic invaders, who conquered and unified a group of Slavic tribes settled south of the Danube, and established the old Bulgarian state, which in the tenth century was the most powerful in the Balkans. For a time the rulers kept their Asiatic speech, also using Greek for official purposes, but were eventually absorbed in the Slavic masses. The Bulgarians are therefore no more an Asiatic people than the French are Germanic because the Franks gave them their name and founded

their state, or than the Russians are a Scandinavian people because the Scandinavian adventurers called Ros gave them their name and founded their state. Certain physical characteristics of the Asiatic are, however, still evident, especially in eastern Bulgaria. And the Asiatic connection is not forgotten at times when their relations with other Slavs are strained, as with Russians or Serbians, who are then inclined to dub them "Semi-Slavs" or "Mongols."

The Bulgarians were the first of the Balkan peoples to fall under Turkish rule, and the last to emerge, if we except the Albanians, among whom Turkish rule was hardly more than nominal. The Bulgarian nationality was the one most completely submerged, the most nearly lost forever. It was not so much from the Turks that their denationalization was threatened as from the Greeks, who held complete control of church and education. The well-to-do Bulgarians spoke Greek and called themselves Greek. The peasants spoke their various dialects, but had lost all national consciousness, and the very name Bulgarian was forgotten. The revival began with a resuscitation of the language: the first modern Bulgarian book was printed in 1806, the first Bulgarian school was founded in 1835 and in two years the number had become fifty. The long struggle for church independence, vigorously opposed by the Greeks, culminated in the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate in 1870. The people which had remained docile and unmoved at the time when the Serbians and the Greeks were fighting for independence was now at last awakening, though even in the Russio-Turkish war it was only an interested spectator. It is the development of Bulgaria since 1878 that has astounded the world. But this was made possible by the preceding period in which national consciousness was revived through the language.

The two Balkan peoples that are neither Slavic nor Greek, the Roumanians and the Albanians, obviously owe their distinction of nationality to their language. The Roumanian language is a derivative of Latin. Hence the Roumanians, no matter what people they were before being Romanized or in what region this process took place (for it is by no means certain that they represent the unbroken continuation of Roman col-

onies in Dacia), are a "Latin race" in the same sense as the French or Spanish. This is a definite factor in their national consciousness and affects their sympathies. But this consciousness of Latin nationality is a matter of comparatively recent history. From the time of their earliest mention the Roumanians appear in connection with Slavs, and their church language was the Church Slavonic till near the middle of the seventeenth century. There was no written Roumanian before the middle of the sixteenth, and this was written in the Slavic (Cyrillic) alphabet down to most recent times, the official adoption of the Latin alphabet in Roumania dating from 1873.

It was the Catholic clergy of Transylvania that first taught the Roumanians that they were a "Latin race" and aroused a sense of distinct nationality. This national sentiment spread to the larger body in the present Roumania, which was under Turkish rule and, in the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth, under dominant Greek influence, and here it developed most effectively. Since the independence of Roumania it has in turn supported the Transylvanian Roumanians in their resistance to Magyarization, and hopes for their ultimate political union with Roumania.

The Vlachs of Macedonia, whose vernacular is closely akin to Roumanian, have never developed any sense of Roumanian nationality. The Roumanian propaganda which started about 1886 had small effect. The great majority of the Vlachs speak Greek, as well as their own dialect, and are Greek in sentiment. In fact some of the most ardent supporters of Greek nationality are of Vlach descent, as Mr. Averof, the donor of the stadium at Athens and the warship of that name.

The Albanians represent a portion of the old Illyrians which in this mountainous region just missed the complete Romanization and subsequent absorption by Slavs that took place farther north. We say just missed complete Romanization because, as it is, the largest single constituent of the Albanian vocabulary is of Latin origin; and in spite of the very extensive Turkish, Greek, and Slavic elements, due to later borrowing, it would be reckoned as one of the Romance languages, were it not for the presence of a perfectly distinct pre-Roman substratum.

If we except the partial and shortlived union under their national hero Skanderbeg in the fifteenth century, the Albanians never formed a distinct state. The language only has kept alive their sense of being a distinct nationality, and in the revolution of 1911–12 the recognition of Albanian as the official language in Albania and the right to organize education in their own language was one of their formal demands. In the last few years the educated leaders have been busy with the problem of a standard language and its most appropriate written form, to replace the variety of dialect and transcription which had been in vogue. This may seem ludicrously futile in face of the present chaotic conditions. But it is by education, and in their own languge, that it will be possible, if at all, to overcome such obstacles to effective union as the ignorance and backwardness of the bulk of the population, their primitive tribal organization with the unwritten law of blood-feuds, and the religious division of Moslem and Christian, and of the latter into Catholic and Orthodox, And if it seems that the experiment of an independent Albania is a hopeless failure, it must be remembered that the continuance of foreign intrigue has never left it a fair chance.

If the relation between language and nationality has been illustrated chiefly from the minor peoples of Eastern Europe, it is because here the evolution or revival of national sentiment has been of so recent date as to make this relation particularly conspicuous. For the more firmly established nationalities the situation is so familiar that it is almost superfluous to refer to it. It is only the exceptional case, like that of Switzerland or Belgium, that excites remark. Furthermore, language may seem to lose relative importance in the presence of other factors such as a strong national state. But its vital relation to nationality is no less real. Does any one doubt, for example, that the German language is not only the most conspicuous outward token but the very essence of German nationality? "Preserve our German language" has been the motto of the Pan-German League, as "Preserve our Italian language" has been the appeal of the Italian Irredentists.